Possible future recycling is not a strategy; it is merely a hope.
Used fuel is already present; it exists today in storage pools and interim facilities, accumulating year after year. Pointing to some future technology does not change this physical reality; it only postpones our responsibility.
Recycling may eventually come to fruition. It may even become efficient and economical. However, its timing, scale, and acceptance in policy are all uncertain. These uncertainties do not mitigate the need to manage what we currently possess.
Allowing spent nuclear fuel to accumulate while waiting for a future solution is not a neutral act. It increases inventory, extends storage risks, and quietly shifts the burden forward. The longer we wait, the larger and more complex the problem becomes.
Engineering does not operate this way. You do not defer a necessary safety function because a better system might be available in 30 years. Instead, you design for what is needed now, utilizing solutions that are proven and available.
Geological disposal is not a failure of imagination; it is an acceptance of responsibility. Importantly, it does not eliminate future options.
Modern repositories can be designed to be retrievable—not because we plan to rely on it, but because we acknowledge uncertainty.
If recycling becomes viable in the future, fuel can be recovered. If new information emerges, decisions can be revisited.
Retrievability keeps the door open without perpetuating the problem. However, this flexibility must not be misused.
Future options are valuable, but they are not an excuse.
The waste we produce today must have a destination today.
***
In Finland, the nuclear waste management solution is often regarded as a gold standard due to its clear responsibility structure, a domestic repository, and a credible path from operation to disposal.
To be clear, this system works. However, it is important to examine how it was framed.
From the beginning, the issue was defined from the perspective of the existing utilities—specifically their reactors, fuel, and timelines. The goal was to provide a complete and licensable solution within Finland’s borders, rather than to explore what a globally optimal system might look like or to design an open-ended approach.
By limiting the scope to “Finnish waste only,” the scale of the project was also established. Scale is crucial in this context. A deep geological repository requires a significant fixed effort in areas like characterization, licensing, encapsulation, and underground construction. You cannot build half of a repository.
To justify a full repository in a clean and economic manner, a nuclear capacity of approximately 6 to 10 gigawatts thermal is needed. Finland’s current capacity aligns closely with this requirement.
This alignment explains why the existing system has converged to a single repository—it is the right size for the current fleet and can be scoped, financed, and licensed as a closed system.
However, it also highlights what has been overlooked in the process.
Future utilities were not accounted for in the original design. The system relies on a fixed set of operators and inventory, and it does not function as an open platform where new entrants can easily plug in under predefined conditions.
As new utilities begin to emerge and legislation is revisited, this assumption is becoming increasingly unstable.
If additional capacity is introduced, the design parameters will shift—but it will not be to a point where a second repository makes sense.
This situation leaves us in a challenging middle ground: too large for one repository as initially planned, yet too small for two.
This is not a technical issue; rather, it results from the way the system boundaries were originally set.
Responsibility must remain with the waste producer. This principle is non-negotiable and is one of the strongest aspects of the Finnish model. However, this does not imply that every utility—or country—needs to establish a fully self-contained disposal system.
By allowing waste management to be organized at a system level—with clear entry conditions, maintained producer liability, and the possibility of cross-border participation—the scale problem can be resolved.
A second repository becomes feasible if it is not limited to only Finnish waste.
This entails permitting imports—not as a loophole but as an extension of the same principle: the producer pays and remains accountable, while the execution takes place in locations where geology, expertise, and scale are most advantageous.
The Finnish solution effectively addressed the issue it was designed to solve—for existing utilities and within national boundaries.
What is changing now is not the underlying physics but the context in which the system operates.
This shift creates a unique opportunity to reconsider and address the one assumption that was never truly challenged in the first place
***
When it comes to final disposal of spent nuclear fuel, all geologies are not equal. It would be responsible for countries with the lowest seismic activity - such as Finland - to pull more than their own weight.